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Governing Interdependent Financial Systems:
Lessons from the Vienna Initiative
Katharina Pistor

Abstract
Financial markets have become globally interdependent, yet their governance has remained
national at the core. This friction encumbers crisis management and distorts incentives for crisis
prevention. The Vienna Initiative, formed to manage the fallout from the global crisis in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), offers an alternative coordinated, multi-stakeholder
governance framework. A critical prerequisite for such a regime is a coordinating agent, or ‘anchor
tenant’, that is deeply vested in the stability of transnational financial systems, but does not directly
compete with market actors or regulators. Lessons for more effective governance of financial
interdependence are discussed.
KEYWORDS: global finance, global governance, bank regulation, fiscal responsibility
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I. Introduction
The liberalization of financial markets has given rise to a complex and highly
interdependent financial system where events in one of its parts can easily spread
to others and threaten the entire system. The global financial crisis with its origins
in the US subprime mortgage market has demonstrated the scale and scope of
financial interdependence worldwide. It is particularly pronounced in Europe with
its legally enshrined commitments to the free flow of capital and financial
services. The transformation of the former socialist countries and the accession of
many countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the European Union
provided opportunities for banks from the West to expand eastwards and build
pan-European financial groups.
The emergence of a complex, interdependent, transnational financial
system notwithstanding, the governance of finance has continued to be national at
its core. Regulatory and supervisory standards have been harmonized across
countries; supervisory powers have been divided between home and host
countries;1 yet, lender of last resort responsibility has remained national
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2006). Even at the global level fiscal responsibilities
are delineated nationally. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) may be
international in the manner in which it pools resources and establishes governance
standards, but is strictly bilateral when it comes to the allocation of these
resources and the conditioning of their use.
This paper argues that the primacy of national governance over
transnational finance constrains and distorts ex ante governance and ex post crisis
management. It explores alternative governance regimes that are compatible, in
principle, with fiscal sovereignty of nation states but take account of increasing
financial interdependencies. The paper applies these theoretical considerations to
an emergent transnational governance regime, the Vienna Initiative, which was
created in the midst of the global crisis to prevent a financial meltdown in CEE.
This initiative has evolved from an ad hoc crisis management system into a forum
for deliberating general governance issues for transnational financial markets
under the label “Vienna Plus”.
This paper suggests that the Vienna Initiative displays critical elements for
governing interdependent financial systems: coordinated, multi-stakeholder
governance facilitated by an international agent in the role of anchor tenant
(Powell, 2010) – an agent that is deeply vested in the stability of transnational
financial systems, but does not directly compete with market actors or regulators.
In the initial phase of the Vienna Initiative, the European Bank for Reconstruction
1

The De Larosière Report (2009) commissioned by the EU in the aftermath of the Global Crisis
recommends the use of Colleges of Supervisors for all major transnational financial institutions in
the EU.
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and Development (EBRD) has performed this role, with the EU Commission and
the IMF evolving into co-anchors as the initiative has deepened.
II. Governance Challenges of Interdependent Financial Markets
Financial markets have been at the forefront of globalization. Capital account
liberalization and the high levels of capital mobility have linked financial markets
around the globe. The scale of financial integration as measured by the ratio of
stock of external assets (liabilities) to GDP has increased from only 7 percent on
average in the early 1970s to 300 percent in 2004 (Lane and Milesi-Ferritti,
2007).
The same transnational links that made possible the globalization of
finance, i.e. transnational lending channels, portfolio investments and foreign
direct investment, also served as transmitters of the crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2011). Not all economies were affected at the same time or in the same manner.
The crisis began in the US and the UK, and from there spread to Western Europe
and affected emerging markets in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe (IMF, 2009).
The lag effect and the varying severity of the crisis experienced by different
countries and regions suggests that, globalization notwithstanding, a fully
integrated global markets does not yet exist. At the same time, the inability of
individual countries to decouple from the cascading effects of the global crisis is
indicative of deep interdependencies between financial systems that crisscross
national economic systems. For the purpose of this paper we therefore define
financial interdependence as a level of financial integration that makes it
impossible to decouple in the event of a crisis, yet lacks a centralized governance
structure.
Transnational contagion effects had manifested themselves in earlier
banking crises (Kapstein, 1996). They triggered efforts under the auspices of the
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) to harmonize basic principles of
prudential regulation for transnational banks and to coordinate their supervision.
The Basel Accord, spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking and
Supervision, developed prudential principles for bank regulation, including capital
adequacy rules. The Basel Concordat established a division of labor between
home and host country regulators based on the place of incorporation and
licensure of transnational banks: Regulators of parent banks are responsible for
consolidated supervision of the parent bank and its overseas branches; regulators
in countries where subsidiaries are incorporated are charged with acting as their
home country regulators. Tied to this division of labor is the home country’s
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responsibility to provide liquidity and systemic risk management in the event of
distress.2
The formal distinction between subsidiaries and branches on which this
model is based assumes that de-stabilizing events are local and that de-coupling is
feasible. Yet, the events of the global crisis have demonstrated that the fate of
subsidiaries is closely intertwined with that of their parent banks. Parent banks
that were caught in the crisis withdrew capital not only from their foreign
branches, but also from their foreign subsidiaries (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011;
De Haas, et al., 2011). In countries with high concentrations of foreign owned
subsidiaries this reverse supply shock threatened the stability of the domestic
financial system.
The deepening integration of transnational bank groups would have
warranted much closer coordination between parent and subsidiary regulators, but
this was seriously wanting (Herring, 2007; Kapstein, 2006). Memoranda of
understanding (MoUs) between parent and subsidiary regulators to ensure
information sharing and effective supervision were signed, but rarely put into
action. Moreover, they focused on providing parent bank regulators with relevant
information about subsidiaries, but less on ensuring that regulators of subsidiaries
had sufficient information about parent banks and the risk a reversal of their
fortunes might pose for their countries. In a world of financial interdependencies
where a crisis in a far away country can quickly spread throughout the system and
reach every market, such a fragmented governance structure can easily backfire –
and the global crisis demonstrated that it would.
Interdependencies between financial systems are particularly pronounced
between Western and Eastern Europe. Banks located in Western Europe took
advantage of the liberalization of financial markets in the former socialist
countries to the East and the accession of many CEE countries to the European
Union and expanded eastwards. They acquired formerly state owned banks and
channeled credits to the region either through their web of subsidiaries or by
lending directly across borders – and in foreign currency, thereby adding currency
risk to the lending risk (Pann, et al., 2010). As of 2007, foreign bank groups –
mostly from Austria, Sweden, Italy, France, Germany and Greece – controlled on
average 70 percent of bank assets (ECB, 2005), between 36 (Slovenia) and 98
(Estonia) percent throughout the region (Enoch, 2007).3 The parent banks of these
2

The same division of labor has become part of the EU governance regime for financial
intermediaries with the additional element of the European passport system. See Art. 23 of
DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14
June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ
L177/1, 30 June 2006.
3
See also (Dinger, 2009) who reports for 2004 the share of foreign-owned banks as between 23
percent in Slovenia and 99 percent in Estonia, with Poland having a share of 60, Hungary 65, and
the Czech Republic 90 percent.

Published by De Gruyter, 2011

3

Journal of Globalization and Development, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4

transnational banks used their access to transnational inter-bank lending markets
to fuel the expansion of credit in Eastern Europe, which reached annual growth
rates of over 30 percent in several countries prior to the crisis (Arcalean, et al.,
2007; De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsky, 2011). When interbank lending markets collapsed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, funding
dried up and parent banks began to withdraw capital from the region – an
estimated US $57 bln by early 2009.4
Available crisis responses consisted of well-established national, bilateral,
and supranational strategies. National response strategies dominated in the major
European economies after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Country after country
protected its domestic financial system from collapse by offering lender and
investor of last resort (LLR) facilities without much regard for how this would
affect other countries (IMF, 2009).5 Countries in CEE could not afford similar
bailout packages and turned to the IMF for help. The IMF concluded standby
agreements with Ukraine and Latvia in the fall of 2008 and with Hungary and
Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2009. In addition, it created flexible credit lines with
Poland and Moldova, both in 2009 (IMF, 2011). In line with the IMF’s
established practice, these agreements were bilateral and did not involve countries
that were the home of transnational bank groups with substantial exposure to the
countries now requiring assistance.
The fact that most of the affected countries in the East had already become
members of the European Union or were prospective member states should have
facilitated a more coordinated response strategy.6 The EU has a wellinstitutionalized governance regime for transnational financial markets consisting
of a multi-tier process for harmonizing regulatory and supervisory standards for
financial intermediaries in all EU member states (Lamfalussy, 2001; Vander
Stichele, 2008). EU directives and regulations establish the general policy
framework with detailed technical regulation being left to committees that
specialize in different financial services, such as securities, insurance, and
banking. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was in charge
of implementing and refining banking regulation. It convened representatives of
regulators and supervisors from all member states, consulted with the regulated
industries, and issued guidelines for the implementation of EU directives and
regulations. This should have enabled CEBS to play a critical role in coordinating
the response to the financial crisis in CEE; yet, it remained largely passive. This is
4

Nagy, P. (2009) ‘BIS Data on Cross-Border Flows: A Closer Look’, EBRD Blog, 11 May,
available at: www.ebrdblog.com/2009/05/11/bis-data-on-cross-border-flows-a-closer-look/. (last
visited 3 June 2011).
5
According to the IMF, countries that bailed out their domestic financial systems created a safe
haven for investors, who now began fleeing from emerging markets (IMF, 2009).
6
These countries include Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (not, however, Ukraine).
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not as surprising as it might seem: The threat of financial collapse required LLR
facility, i.e. a fiscal response – not more coordination in the regulation and
supervision of financial intermediaries. Yet, neither CEBS nor any other entity in
the EU has fiscal authority, which remains firmly vested with the EU’s individual
member states.7
Despite these institutional constraints Hungary openly sought a common
European rescue package for the region, but was turned down.8 Countries with
banking systems that were exposed to CEE did not push for a European solution
either. Instead, they hoped that the worse afflicted countries would receive help
from the IMF, and that this would mitigate the effects of a crisis in CEE on their
home systems.9 IMF assistance was indeed forthcoming, but did little to stem the
threat of contagion. This threat was ultimately avoided by a “novel European
private-public coordination platform” (EBRD, et al., 2011), commonly referred to
as the Vienna Initiative.
III. Theoretical Perspectives on Governing Interdependence
Financial interdependence demands more of a governance regime than ex ante
rulemaking and consistent rule implementation. Because interdependence makes
de-coupling prohibitively costly if not impossible, cooperation in ex post crisis
management is critical to avoid a contagious meltdown. Rulemaking and rule
implementation would be sufficient under the assumptions that markets don’t
change, that regulators can identify optimal rules ex ante, and that it is possible to
effectively implement such rules in all parts of an interdependent financial
system. These are highly unrealistic assumptions. First, change, uncertainty and
crises have been a hallmark of financial markets since their inception
(Kindelberger, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). If anything, technological
change and financial innovation have accelerated in recent decades, making the
task of identifying and implementing appropriate regulatory goals all the more
7

A partial exception is the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which was created as a
temporary device in May 2010 in the context of the deepening crisis in Greece. However, it does
not offer support to non-governmental entities, such as banks. For details, see Art. 3 of the EFSF’s
Articles of Incorporation, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm
(last visited 4 June 2011). The EFSF is to be replaced by a permanent European Stability
Mechanism in 2013. See “Term Sheet of the ESM”, Annex II to the Conclusion of the European
Council Meeting, 24/25 March 2011, available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/councilmeetings/conclusions.aspx?lang=en (last visited 4 June 2011).
8
“Ailing in the East: European Union leaders decline to bail out Eastern Europe”, The Economist,
1 March 2009, available at www.economist.com (last visited 15 March 2011).
9
In its financial stability report of June 2009 the Austrian central bank stated with some relief that
‘in light of recent rescue measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios have
become much less likely’ (ONB, 2009).

Published by De Gruyter, 2011

5

Journal of Globalization and Development, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4

difficult, and adding complexity and fragility to the system. Second, even the best
intentioned and well informed rule maker cannot possibly anticipate all future
contingencies that might require regulatory intervention, as law and regulations
are inherently incomplete (Pistor and Xu, 2003). Third, the harmonization of laws
and regulations is typically the result of compromises that deviate from optimal
rules. The history of the Basel Accord suggests that politics, not optimal
rulemaking, has guided much of the process from the original setting of the
capital adequacy rule in Basel I (Kapstein, 1996; Simmons, 2001) to the internal
risk management models in Basel II (Claessens, et al., 2008; Danielsson, et al.,
2001). The same dynamic afflicts attempts to develop international resolution
mechanisms for transnational banks (Howcroft, 2008) and sovereign debt
workouts (Gelpern, 2004).
Nonetheless, most efforts at governing the transnational financial system
continue to focus on rulemaking and rule implementation. Dealing with crossborder bank insolvencies has proved politically intractable, leaving any attempt to
address cross-border fiscal responsibilities beyond reach. A sustainable
interdependent financial system, however, requires a credible crisis resolution
regime and must ensure that the ex ante allocation of regulatory responsibilities is
aligned with such a regime. Instead, accountability for regulatory failure stops at
the border and the effects of contagion are borne by countries where they manifest
themselves. Only in few instances has the IMF been able to ensure private sector
involvement, and typically only when the crisis had deepened sufficiently to force
its hand – and that of the banks (Roubini, 2001). There is even less evidence that
the IMF has ever insisted on burden sharing by home regulators of banks whose
foreign operations were implicated in a crisis, or convened all critical stakeholders
of interdependent financial markets that were implicated by a crisis.10 Instead, the
IMF has tended to treat financial market crises as domestic affairs of individual
countries. Weak institutions, not flaws in the governance of interdependent
financial markets, have been held responsible for transnational crises.11
This approach is exemplified in “International Financial Architecture”, the
IMF’s answer to the East Asian financial crisis. It advocates the streamlining of
rules and regulations that pertain to finance around the globe based on best
practice standards derived from leading market economies, most prominent
among them the US and the UK (Fratianni and Pattison, 2002; IMF, 2003; Pistor,
10

While the US intervened in the Tequila crisis that beset Mexico in 1994, there is no evidence
that the IMF induced this assistance. To the contrary, press reports point to potential conflicts of
interests by then Treasury Secretary Paul Rubin, who used a discretionary Treasury account to
offer US $20 bln bailout assistance, which allegedly benefited his former employer, Goldman
Sachs. See Keith Bradsher, “House votes to Request Clinton Data on Mexico”, The New York
Times, 2 March 1995, available at www.NYTimes.com (last visited 3 June 2011).
11
This approach may be changing inside the IMF. For a more positive assessment of the learning
ability of this institution, see (Lütz and Kranke, 2010).
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2002). There is some irony in the fact that the very countries that served as
models for the international financial architecture designed to address the last
global crisis found themselves at the very heart of the next one. More importantly
for the argument developed in this paper, the IMF’s approach to governing
interdependent financial markets remains focused on domestic, ex ante regulation.
Financial sector assessment programs (FSAPs) have been conducted on a countryby-country basis, and reforms targeted at domestic legal and regulatory
institutions. The gaping hole in the governance of financial interdependencies –
the absence of ex post crisis resolution, including LLR facilities – has not been
addressed.12
The same is true for the governance of finance in the EU. The global
financial crisis exposed the lack of a workable governance framework for
interdependent finance. Not surprisingly, the immediate crisis response became a
national affair.13 There is a more positive account of European governance in the
literature, which asserts that experimental, multi-stakeholder governance has
become a hallmark of EU governance. According to this account, formal EU
bodies develop broad principles of coordinated governance, with the fine-tuning
and implementation being left to multiple stakeholders in a process that amounts
to “direct, deliberative polyarchy” (DDP) (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). Sabel and
Zeitlin list the Lamfalussy process for governing European financial markets as
one such example. However, the Lamfalussy process has been far less democratic
and deliberative than they envisioned and instead was affected by the “possible
domination by large states/producer interests” (ibid at 297). The interests of home
and host countries within CEBS were not well balanced (Pistor, 2010); most of
the relevant financial service directives were promulgated before the accession of
new member states that became important destinations for trans-European capital
flows. While the new member states nominally had a voice in CEBS, they were
not in the inner circle of country representatives with long-established relations.
Private actors were consulted and commented on draft guidelines issued by
CEBS, such as the home-host guidelines, but here again the well-established
financial industry from the old member states dominated (Pistor, 2011).
A common response to the shortcomings of transnational governance that
has to rely ultimately on national enforcement institutions is the establishment of
a supranational agent. Leaving aside the political feasibility of such a move, it is
questionable on theoretical grounds whether a single centralized institution is an
appropriate solution for governing financial interdependence. Several arguments
12

While the possibility of a bankruptcy regime for sovereign debt has been discussed (see
(Krueger, 2002)), these discussions have not extended to private credit resolutions.
13
While the EU later scrutinized these bailout packages under its state-aid principles, these
principles did not prevent individual governments from coming to the aid of its financial sector in
the midst of the crisis. See (Dewatripont, et al., 2010) and (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010).
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speak against this. First, centralized governance based on hierarchical structures
of authority (Coase, 1937) is not very conducive for governing systems that are
characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability (Minsky, 1986). Organizational
theory has shown that traditional unitary, or U-Form organizations with a
hierarchical monitoring and governance apparatus are well positioned for
implementing strategies for knowable and controllable outcomes; however, they
tend to impede innovation. In contrast, decentralized organizations that divide
management responsibilities among multiple functional departments (M-Forms)
are more likely to offer flexible solutions under conditions of uncertainty and are
more conducive to innovation (Qian, et al., 2006; Williamson, 1975).
Furthermore, the internal governance structure of classic centralized
agents is not well attuned for governing interdependencies. The IMF is the most
likely organization to assume such a role. Its internal governance structure has
been much debated and only gradually and reluctantly reformed.14 The major
critique is that it is undemocratic, beholden to the immediate post WWII
geopolitical order that no longer exists (Tan, 2006; Woods, 2006), and captured
by the financial industry (Mattli and Woods, 2009). While this may well be true,
it is not clear that equal voting rights or their weighing by population would make
the IMF a better agent of interdependent financial markets. The global financial
system does not affect all countries in the same manner, and the size of its
population may not be the best indicator for determining a country’s risk exposure
to global finance. More relevant is whether a country is the home of major
transnational banks, or a destination market for the financial services they
provide. This is what determines their regulatory sovereignty or exposure to the
efficacy of other countries’ regulators. Another important factor is whether a
country has sufficient resources or borrowing capacity to function as LLR in the
event of a crisis, or will require IMF assistance. Neither is it apparent that changes
in the voting arrangement of the IMF would necessarily weaken the power of the
financial industry, which, as a result of financial liberalization has become
sufficiently mobile to survive changes in the political bargaining power of their
current home states.
Comparisons with the arguably more democratic governance structure
within the EU highlight that democratic governance does not assure effective
governance of interdependencies. All EU member states were represented at
CEBS, which worked by consensus, or votes weighed by population in the event
consensus could not be reached. However, these arrangements did not protect the
Baltic countries from aggressive expansion strategies by Swedish banks, or
address the risk of CEE countries to Austrian banks, which controlled on average
20 percent of the market share throughout the region (ONB, 2009).
14

For the latest reform of voting rights at the IMF see
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx (last visited 13 June 2011).
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Giving all countries within a regional or global club equal voice in
governance and crisis resolution would arguably be both over- and underinclusive: Over-inclusive because not all countries are equally interdependent
with one another; under-inclusive because financial systems are not bounded by
the territory of the EU. Thus, UK banks were more closely intertwined with Irish
than with CEE markets; Spanish banks had expanded in Latin America, but, at
least prior to the crisis,15 hardly in Eastern Europe; and Austrian banks had
developed financial markets not only in new EU members states, such as Hungary
and the Czech Republic, but also in non-members like Croatia, Ukraine and
Russia.
The new EU regime that was adopted after the crisis incorporates many of
the old regime’s defects. At least on paper, the reform package sought to
strengthen the EU’s hand in regulating financial markets by elevating them from
‘committees’ to ‘authorities’16 and giving them a new internal governance
structure with a chairman and board.17 At the same time, the reforms explicitly
confirmed national sovereignty in fiscal affairs by including a provision that states
that the new European System of Financial Regulators shall not take any action
that might impinge on the fiscal sovereignty of the EU’s member states.18
A more promising solution to the challenges of governing financial
interdependence is coordinated governance. Such a governance regime would not
be territorially bounded, but open-ended to reflect the actual scale and scope of
interdependent financial markets. All regulators and fiscal authorities from
countries that partake in these markets, whether as host or home countries, as well
as financial intermediaries, would participate in this regime. An open question is
how such a networked structure would be created and maintained. Networks are
not uncommon in the governance of international relations (Ruggie, 2004), with
the G7, the G8, and now the G20 being only the most visible among them (Payne,
2010). However, self-organized networks resemble clubs whose members share
certain common interests and protect them through entry barriers. In contrast,
governing interdependent financial markets requires coordination among
stakeholders with conflicting interests. Bringing together diverse stakeholders can
greatly enhance the prospects of finding innovative solutions for new challenges
(Burt, 1995; Powell, 1990). However, self-organization is less likely given the
15

They did, however, acquire several banks during the crisis. See EBRD, EIB and World Bank
Group (2011).
16
The Committee for European Bank Supervisors (CEBS), for example, was reincarnated as the
European Banking Authority (EBA).
17
See Arts. 6, 43, 47, 48, 53 of Directive 2010/78/EU, op. cit. at 26.
18
See specifically the REGULATION (EU) No 1093/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), establishing in recital 5 that new European
supervisors should not “impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States”.
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divergent interests. Sometimes a crisis can bring about a new configuration of
previously adverse stakeholders (Padgett and McLean, 2006). Alternatively, an
agent with convening power vis-à-vis all relevant stakeholders can accomplish
this. Such an agent has been dubbed an “anchor tenant”19 (Powell, 2010):
“The anchor tenant is not disinterested, in the sense of being neutral, but is
not directly competitive with the other types of organizations that inhabit
the community. [They] (...) occupy positions that provide them with
access to diverse participants and the legitimacy to engage with and enroll
others in ways that facilitate the extension of collective resources. This
ability to span disparate domains has proven valuable in high-velocity
environments where resources, power, and wealth are constantly shifting
(ibid at 71).”
The demands on such an agent are markedly different from the functions
the IMF has played in crisis management. Rather than seeking to stabilize an
individual country, the anchor tenant would target the system. Not only a country
in crisis, but all relevant stakeholders in the interdependent system, whether
public or private, domestic or foreign, markets already in crisis or those being
exposed to channels that might transmit the crisis, would be involved in the
governance regime. Ideally, such a regime would operate not only as a crisis
management system, but also to prevent crises. The critical institutional design
problem for such a regime is the identification of an agent that is capable of
performing the role of anchor tenant. The following discussion of the Vienna
Initiative will demonstrate that a regime with the features just outlined is feasible
and that it is possible to identify important characteristics of prospective anchor
tenants.
IV. The Vienna Initiative
When the global crisis reached CEE, the stakeholders in the interdependent
financial system that spanned the European continent were stuck in a classic
prisoner’s dilemma. Each faced incentives to protect its immediate interests, but
doing so was likely to trigger the collapse of the financial system in CEE, and
possibly beyond.
At the outset of the crisis Western European banking groups that had
expanded into CEE appeared to be sufficiently diversified to survive a shock in
one part of the system without having to scale back their operations considerably
19

Literally, the term ‘anchor tenant’ refers to a critical tenant in a newly established shopping
center, one that is capable of attracting other tenants as well as customers. See, for example,
(Gatzlaff, et al., 1994).
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(ONB, 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that transnational financial groups
tend to cross-subsidize subsidiaries in domestic downturns to stabilize the group
(De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010). Pan-European bank groups did just that in
2007 and the beginning of 2008, which explains why the financial systems in the
CEE region remained fairly stable during the early period of the crisis (Berglöf, et
al., 2009). This changed, however, when the parent banks themselves were caught
in the global financial downturn. They were now confronting the need to recapitalize core operations and began to withdraw capital from the periphery.
The parents’ home country regulators re-enforced the impetus to
concentrate on the core. As the financial crisis deepened, several parent banks
received a bailout from their home country authorities, which came with the
explicit or implicit condition that they be used exclusively for domestic banks
(Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010).20 Regulators in CEE countries with a strong
presence of foreign bank subsidiaries responded to the threat of a reverse capital
flow by taking defensive measures. Most had initially welcomed the rapid
expansion of credit markets facilitated by foreign capital flows.21 Still, some had
tried to stem the flow of credit as they grew fearful of a credit bust (Arcalean,
Calvo-Gonzales, More, Rixtel, Winkler and Zumer, 2007). The countermeasures
they took, such as increasing reserve requirements or imposing credit ceilings on
banks within their jurisdiction, proved largely unsuccessful (Bednarski and
Starnowski, 2007; Hilbers, et al., 2007). Foreign bank groups could easily
sidestep them by lending directly to customers in other member states,22 or by
channeling capital through unregulated financial intermediaries.23 Against this
background host countries sought to disavow legal obligations enshrined in the
home-host division of labor to insure the deposits of foreign subsidiaries or to
provide them with liquidity. Some even threatened to ring-fence assets of bank
subsidiaries as capital was leaving their countries (Popov and Udell, 2010).24
20

Austria limited its bailout facility to financial institutions regulated under its banking legislation,
which includes branches of Austrian banks in other countries, but not their subsidiaries. See Sec. 1
“Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz“(financial
market
stabilization
law)
available
at
http://www.fmarktbet.at/cms/cms.php?pageName=73 (last visited 4 June 2011).
21
Note that prior to the crisis credit growth for foreign owned banks tended to be higher in most
countries in the region than in state owned or domestic banks. See (De Haas, Korniyenko,
Loukoianova and Pivovarsky, 2011) Table 1.
22
This practice was based on the principle of free movement of capital enshrined in the Treaty and
further endorsed by the “European Passport System”, which allows banks that were authorized by
one member state to offer financial services throughout the European Union. For details see
(Pistor, 2011).
23
The Austrian National Bank investigated the lending practices of Austrian banks in 2009 and
reported that many used leasing companies and direct lending to continue credit expansion in
countries where restrictions were imposed on their subsidiaries. See (ONB, 2009).
24
Popov and Udell (2010) document that foreign bank subsidiaries were more likely to curtail
credits and reduce their capital than domestic banks.
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Home countries, for their part, were mostly concerned with rescuing their
domestic financial system, not with system-wide effects.
The European Central Bank (ECB) saw the crisis in CEE unfolding, but
was institutionally constrained. The ECB’s mandate is restricted to maintaining
price stability25 and to countries that belong to the Eurozone. Yet, many countries
that were afflicted by the crisis in CEE had not adopted the euro. Sweden, whose
banks had expanded aggressively in the Baltics where they controlled over one
third of total foreign bank funding,26 is not part of the Eurozone. Of the new
member states that were at the center of the financial storm, only Slovenia had
already adopted the euro (in 2007), with Slovakia following in 2009. Still, as the
crisis deepened, the ECB offered euro liquidity to the central banks of Denmark,
Sweden, Poland and Hungary. Unlike the US Federal Reserve, however, the ECB
required Euro denominated collateral from countries that were not part of the
Eurozone (Moessner and Allen, 2010), thereby limiting the measure’s effect.27
The Vienna Initiative emerged in this context. The heads of several bank
groups with a strong presence in CEE wrote a letter to the European Commission
(EC) that was copied to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the EBRD.28
The letter sought to put pressure on CEE countries to grant liquidity support to
local subsidiaries. By calling simultaneously on the EC, the EIB and the EBRD,
the banks were exposing the governance vacuum at the heart of the pan-European
financial system: the lack of an ultimate guardian for the interdependent, panEuropean financial system (Pistor, 2011).
The banks’ call notwithstanding, the EC stayed on the sideline as it had
throughout the earlier stages of crisis, when member states took their fate into
their own hands and bailed out their domestic banks. Of the supranational
organizations addressed in the letter, the EBRD was the only one that responded
immediately. In collaboration with the Austrian Ministry of Finance it organized
25

See Art. 2 of the Protocol No. 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of
the European Central Bank, OJ C115/230, last amended 9 May 2008. Available at
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1341/1343/html/index.en.html (last visited 13 June 2011).
26
Robert Anderson, “Baltic Risk to Swedish Banks”, The Financial Times, 12 August, 2008,
available at www.ft.com (last visited 3 June 2011).
27
These measures fell well short of those taken by the US Federal Reserve (Fed), which extended
liquidity provisions for selected countries around the world, accepting local currencies as
collateral. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the US (Fed), Press Release
29 October 2008, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081029b.htm (last visited 15 March
2011).
28
Stefan Wagstyl, “Banks ask for crisis funds for eastern Europe”, The Financial Times, 21
January 2009, available at www.ft.com (last visited 25 May 2011). The banks involved in the
initiative were Raiffeisen and Erste Bank (Austria); Unicredit and Intessa Sanpaolo (Italy); Societe
General (France); KBC (Belgium); Bayerische Landesbank (Germany); Swedbank (Sweden); SEB
and EFG Eurobank (Greece).

12

Pistor: Governing Interdependent Financial Systems

several brainstorming sessions, each initially devoted to a single group of
stakeholders (banks, ministers of finance, regulators). It cooperated with the
World Bank Group and the EIB to provide resources to pan-European bank
groups to prevent a major capital retrenchment in the CEE host countries. This
“Joint IFI Action Plan”, “In Support of Banking Systems and Lending to the Real
Economy in Central and Eastern Europe”, initially mobilized €24.5 bln and
ultimately disbursed €33 bln (EBRD, EIB and WorldBank, 2011). The plan
signaled the commitment by IFIs to tackle the crisis as a regional crisis rather than
several distinct national ones and came at a critical moment when conditions in
Romania and Serbia were deteriorating, threatening contagion throughout the
region (Nitsche, 2010). Thus, IFI funding provided a critical component in the
total amounts made available. National bailout funds and their extension to
foreign subsidiaries, bank rollovers, and IFI funding each on its own would have
been insufficient to stabilize the region, but the combined effort achieved this
goal.29
The stakeholder meetings and additional meetings organized jointly with
the IMF in countries most affected by the crisis culminated in a joint meeting in
Vienna in March of 2009 at which all relevant public sector stakeholders were
present: finance ministries, regulators and central banks from host and home
countries, IFIs (the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD), the EC, and the ECB as
observer. After a day of discussions in which each group of stakeholders was able
to voice its needs and demands on others, the following commitments were made:
•

•
•

•

Host countries committed to conduct reasonable macroeconomic
policies in accordance with IFI agreements, to provide liquidity and
deposit insurance to subsidiaries of foreign bank groups, and not to
ring-fence assets;
Home countries agreed to make bailout money available to bank
groups without constraining where these resources were used;
IFIs offered funding to pan-European bank groups, to stand by
individual countries, and to stay engaged in monitoring regional
developments.
At subsequent country-specific meetings,30 bank groups committed in
writing not to disengage from CEE, to maintain the financial health of

29

I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the interdependence of these funding
sources.
30
Note that at subsequent full Vienna Initiative meetings, banks participated directly. This is also
reflected in the new name attributed to it: “The European Bank Coordination Initiative”.
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their subsidiaries, to consent to stress tests conducted by the IMF, and
to make their commitments public.31
Each of these commitments went well beyond the narrow self-interest that
had characterized the immediate and primarily national responses to the crisis in
other countries. This was made possible because they were reciprocated in an
open forum by commitments from other stakeholders. As one participant of the
meeting observed, the open forum where all stakeholders had a voice induced
each one to offer more than they individually had been willing to give: “It pushed
them to their limits”.32
None of the commitments were legally binding, nor were sanctions
announced for defectors. Neither was the meeting simply a venue for a mediation
process. Mediation entails splitting differences typically in a situation where
litigation remains a fallback option, or where one party might walk away from the
deal unless a reasonable solution is found. In contrast, the Vienna Initiative
created ground rules that facilitated extensive coordination among all stakeholders
that had to contribute to stabilize the system. These ground rules included an
agreement to agree; open deliberations; and publicity about commitments made.33
Between March and June 2009 a series of meetings followed that focused
on individual countries one at a time. They identified specific financial and
regulatory needs of a country or bank group and defined the commitments made
by the IMF and other multilateral lending organizations. Following the procedural
rules established by the Vienna Initiative, at each of these meetings parent banks
signed commitment letters for the countries in question and these commitments
were made public (Nitsche, 2010).34 Separate meetings were held during the
annual spring meeting of the IMF and the Annual Meeting of the EBRD with

31

These commitments became part of the IMF agreements with the crisis countries. See for
example the Concluding Statement of Participating Banks at the Financial Sector Coordination
Meeting for Romania of 26 March 2009, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2009/032609.htm (last visited 13 June 2011).
32
Interview with Vienna Initiative participants, on file with the author. The comparison with the
crisis meetings on Greece’s sovereign debt is striking. The Greek delegation did not partake in the
closed-door meetings at which the rescue package was announced. See Nicholas Kulish and
Steven Erlanger, “In Greek Pact, Compromises and Intrigues”, The New York Times, 22 July
2011, A1, B4.
33
See also Camilla Anderson, “Agreement with Banks Limits Crisis in Emerging Europe”, IMF
Online, October 2009, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/int102809a.htm (last visited, 31 May 2011).
34
The financial contributions banks made to their subsidiaries in CEE over and above the financial
support they received from their home governments is difficult to quantify. Still, these
commitments compare well with the use of taxpayer moneys by banks elsewhere (Taliaverro,
2009).
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home and host country representatives to assess the implementation of the Vienna
Initiative.
In September 2009, another full Vienna Initiative meeting was held in
Brussels, this time under the chairmanship of John Berrigan, from the EU’s
Directorship General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECOFIN).
Seventeen parent bank groups, up from ten that had called for a European
response to the crisis in November of 2008, their home and host country
supervisors, and fiscal authorities participated, as did the IMF, the EC with
representatives from the Directorate-General for Competition and CEBS, the EIB,
the World Bank, the EBRD, and the ECB as observer.35 At the subsequent
meeting in Athens in the spring of 2010, twenty bank groups and thirteen
countries were represented (De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsky,
2011).
The Vienna Initiative succeeded in stabilizing the region by avoiding an
uncoordinated withdrawal of capital from the region. Recent evidence suggests
that subsidiaries of banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative maintained a
larger credit portfolio than those that did not (de Haas et al. 2011). It prevented
the socialization of debt by governments in the region, which would have most
likely spurred a sovereign debt crisis along the lines of Ireland and Portugal. In
addition, the Vienna Initiative laid the foundation for coordinated governance that
has proved sufficiently resilient to survive the immediate period of crisis
management. This does not mean that the Vienna Initiative achieved an equitable
cost distribution. The concessions of banks and their home authorities
notwithstanding, countries in CEE still bore the brunt of the crisis. Indeed,
pressure from the EU and its member states ensured that countries that received
IMF assistance had to comply with conventional structural adjustment programs
(Lütz and Kranke, 2010). However, in comparison with other crises in emerging
markets, but also with the crises in Ireland and Portugal, the outcome of the
Vienna Initiative is remarkable.
The Vienna Initiative is often described as a unique ad hoc crisis
resolution mechanism. De Haas et al. (2011) attribute its success to the fact that
the number of creditor banks was relatively limited as compared to the East Asian
financial crisis, for example. This dovetails with research on workouts of firms
suggesting that the number of creditors is an important factor in the feasibility of a
private workout rather than a formal bankruptcy proceeding (Gilson, et al., 1990).
Yet, the total number of creditors may be less relevant than the ability to
coordinate their action. The argument developed in this paper therefore stresses
the importance of coordination and the attributes of the coordinating agent(s). A
35

See “Largest Foreign Banks In Hungary Pledge Support To Local Units” with a summary of the
concluding statement of the joint forum meeting held in Brussels on 24 September. Available at
http://www.xpatloop.com/news/62975 (last visited 5 February 2011).
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critical factor for the success of the Vienna Initiative was the presence of an
anchor tenant with a clear commitment to the region and the authority to bring
together all critical stakeholders for resolving the crisis. More than one
organization helped coordinate the Vienna Initiative, including the IMF, the
EBRD, and the European Commission. However, it was the EBRD that
spearheaded the regionalization of the crisis resolution. As discussed previously,
the European Commission joined the process, but did so wholeheartedly only in
the summer of 2009 after its success had already been established. The IMF had
played a critical role in preventing a financial collapse in CEE through standby
agreements since October 2008. Yet, these were not coordinated and instead
followed the IMF’s traditional bilateral, country-by-country approach. The
important role the EBRD played in the Vienna Initiative can also be gauged from
the management of the credit crises in Ireland and Portugal, which, unlike the
crisis in CEE, was allowed to balloon into a sovereign debt crisis. In this crisis,
both the IMF and the European Commission was involved, but neither made an
attempt to create a coordinated workout at an early stage along the lines of the
Vienna Initiative.
Identifying a potential anchor tenant for coordinating governance thus is a
critical step in designing a governance regime for interdependent financial
markets. This calls attention to the organizational features of agents that have
proved to be capable of playing such a role, in this case the EBRD.
The EBRD is the youngest of the IFIs, which include the original Bretton
Woods Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, and its regional sister
institutions for Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was established in 1990 with
the mandate to support the transformation in the formerly socialist countries in
CEE from centrally planned to market economies. As in the case of other IFIs, its
equity holders are states as well as several international organizations. Unlike
other IFIs, it is explicitly charged with working with and through the private
sector.36 The goal was to strengthen non-state actors and develop viable markets
in transition economies, not to reform state socialism through state institutions.
The EBRD’s mandate is reflected in how it spends its money, the bulk of which is
invested in private sector projects, often with co-funding from the private sector
(EBRD, 2010). Success and failure of the projects are thus directly reflected in the
EBRD’s own financial statements. The EBRD’s task to work directly with the

36

Art. 1 of the Agreement specifically states that the EBRD’s mandate is “to foster the transition
towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in
the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty
democracy, pluralism and market economics.” Art. 2 specifies as its functions the development of
competitive private markets through “private and other interested investors” and the mobilization
of domestic and foreign capital to promote these ends.
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private sector – in fact, it has substantial equity exposure to banks in the region37
– has placed it in much closer proximity to private actors than is usually the case
for IFIs.38 This has situated the EBRD at the crossroads of private and public
actors, with knowledge of and access to both, lending it credibility to bring both
sides together, or to bridge the “structural hole” (Burt, 1995) that separates them
by conventional approaches to regulation.
The internal organization and governance of the EBRD is also more
conducive to flexible response strategies than those of the classic Bretton Woods
Organizations. The latter are characterized by high levels of bureaucratization to
ensure consistency and accountability (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). These very
features, however, make them less responsive to new challenges. In contrast, the
organization of the EBRD is divided between investment operations that are
subject to similar bureaucratic mechanisms, and a policy division headed by the
office of the chief economist. The latter reports directly to the president of the
bank. The fewer bureaucratic controls this organizational feature imposes means
that the EBRD’s policy arm can respond more flexibly to new challenges as they
arise.
A potential disadvantage of the EBRD is that its resources are relatively
limited. Its annual business volume on 2010 was €9 bln; the accumulated net
volume €62 bln (up from 47.7 in 2009). Recent increases in business volume
mostly in response to the crisis notwithstanding, this makes the EBRD a small
player. On the positive side, a small budget limits the temptation to over-lend.39
Moreover, the EBRD’s modest financial prowess has forced the bank to reach out
to other IFIs and thereby broaden the scope of participants in the governance of a
regional crisis.
The above account holds several lessons for identifying and designing
anchor tenants for governing interdependent financial systems. An anchor tenant
must have the trust and authority of relevant stakeholders, which needs to be built
over time. In cases where diverse stakeholders are critical for sustaining a
complex, interdependent system, the anchor tenant must build relations with all of
them. Flexibility is critical so that it can respond to changes in a dynamic
environment. Weberian bureaucracies with their emphasis on predictability and
stability that dominate the world of international organizations (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004) are less suited for this task than are organizations with greater
37

According to the 2011 financial report, at the end of 2010, 66.4 percent of total equity exposures
was in banks (up from 61.7 percent), compared to only 13 percent in sovereigns. (EBRD, 2010).
38
The IFC is a partial exception to this rule, but unlike the EBRD, it does not combine a broader
developmental agenda with private sector initiatives.
39
A strong argument can be made that multiplying the sources of finance is of critical importance
when financing projects with uncertain outcomes. Having more than one creditor review a
decision to extend financing at stage two of the project is an important commitment device against
throwing ‘good’ money after ‘bad’ money. See (Huang and Xu, 2000).
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flexibility in their internal governance structure and in their relation to other
stakeholders. Given the critical importance of private and public actors in today’s
interdependent financial systems, agents that are designed to interact exclusively
with either government or private actors have a disadvantage. Last but not least,
an anchor tenant must be able to engage diverse stakeholders while retaining its
independence and credibility among all. This paradox appears to be easier
resolved by lean organizations that need to persuade others about the merits of
their undertaking than by behemoths that have the resources to dictate strategies.
V. Outlook
The Vienna Initiative emerged in the midst of the global crisis. It developed a
novel strategy for managing a highly interdependent financial system in crisis. Its
most important contribution has been the establishment of a private-public
coordination platform with an anchor tenant at its core. If all the Vienna Initiative
had done was to mitigate the impact of the global crisis in CEE, this alone would
be deemed a success, but it would have hardly justified the claim it might evolve
into a novel and sustainable governance regime for interdependent financial
markets. Yet, this appears to be happening. Participants in the Vienna Initiative
have launched a new phase, “Vienna Plus”, which goes well beyond crisis
management (EBRD, 2011). Specifically, the agenda for Vienna Plus calls for
collaboration on regulatory issues among countries inside and outside of the
European Union to take account of the actual reach of the pan-European financial
market; it seeks to address issues of foreign currency-based lending, monitoring
of the speed of credit growth, and a continued commitment to private/public
coordination under the auspices of the EBRD.
“Vienna Plus” has maintained its only partially institutionalized form. The
initiative is not housed anywhere and does not have a statute, management board
or by-laws. It remains open to new participants and has retained its commitment
to deliberation and publicity. Standard accounts that associate institutionalization
with greater standardization of practices and eventual bureaucratization
(Huntington, 1965) may dismiss this as unsustainable. In contrast, this paper has
argued that coordinated governance is feasible and indeed necessary for
governing financial interdependence. It has suggested that coordination can be
achieved even when critical stakeholders have conflicting interests, as in this case
host country governments, foreign banks and their home regulators. This,
however, requires proactive coordination by a central agent. The paper has
borrowed Powell’s concept of the “anchor tenant” to suggest that international
organizations may play a critical role as anchor tenant – provided they are
designed to facilitate flexibility, responsiveness and independence.
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